Frontmatter

hsp: TBD
title: Establish House of Stake Operational & Proposal Co-Funding Budget for 2026
description: Defines the operational budget required for House of Stake to function as an independent Treasury Governance Engine, covering infrastructure, legal, compliance, and execution capabilities.
author: House of Stake Head of Governance
discussions-to: TBD
status: Withdrawn, new proposal: https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-house-of-stake-operational-budget-for-july-2026-june-2027/42199
track: Decision
type: Simple Majority
category: Operations
stakeholders: NEAR tokenholders, House of Stake Foundation, proposal authors and stakeholders, NEAR Foundation, NEAR ecosystem
created: 2026-05-04
requires: House of Stake 2.0 Mandate Update , House of Stake Constitutional Documents and House of Stake Foundation legal documents

UPDATE June 04: This proposal has been withdrawn and replaced by a new, updated version:

Establish House of Stake Operational Budget for July 2026 – June 2027 Frontmatter hsp: TBD title: Establish House of Stake Operational Budget for July 2026 – June 2027 description: Defines the operational budget required for House of Stake to function as a Treasury Governance Engine, covering governance operations, legal compliance, treasury management, and execution capabilities. author: House of Stake Head of Governance (@AK_HoG) discussions-to: https://hos-fe-staging-4may-updates-staging.up.…

Abstract

This proposal establishes the operational budget for House of Stake Season #1 (April–December 2026), enabling it to function as an independent governance institution and NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine.
The budget focuses on infrastructure, legal, compliance, and execution capabilities, ensuring that House of Stake can operate securely, transparently, and effectively.
It does not include costs for personell, shared software licenses and any other cost items not listed in this proposal.
These costs have not been subject of a tokenholder vote and will continue to be covered by NEAR Foundation.

Budget Overview (Season #1, April–Dec 2026)

All figures in USD ($’000).

Operational Budget:
$460.75
Contingency Buffer: $150.00 (variable, bound to spending rules and approvals, see Buffer & Risk Management, Allocation Rules)
Co-Funding Pool: up to $500.00 (programmatic, based on tokenholder vote, see HoS Skin-in-the-Game (Co-Funding Pool))

Upon approval, this proposal authorizes the Head of Governance and the House of Stake Foundation:

• to deploy Operational Budget as outlined in this proposal
• to deploy Buffer Funds based on the policies defined in section Buffer & Risk Management, Allocation Rules.
• to deploy funds in the Co-Funding Pool based on separate tokenholder votes on upcoming proposals in Season #1, according to section HoS Skin-in-the-Game (Co-Funding Pool).

Any unused funds at the end of Season #1 will remain in House of Stake’s treasury.

Context

House of Stake is entering its next phase: becoming an independent institution responsible for governing NEAR’s economic policy and treasury.
To fulfill this role, House of Stake must transition into a fully operational governance system, capable of managing treasury flows, executing decisions, ensuring compliance, and operating securely.

With this transition, House of Stake will also introduce skin in the game through a co-funding pool, aligning its own treasury with the outcomes of governance decisions.

Problem

House of Stake currently lacks its own dedicated operational infrastructure and budget.
Without this:

• Governance decisions cannot be reliably executed
• Treasury operations remain dependent on NEAR Foundation
• Legal and compliance risks increase
• Transparency and accountability are limited

Approach

This proposal establishes a minimum viable operational budget for Season #1.
It focuses on:

• Infrastructure over team expansion
• Efficiency over duplication
• Execution capability over complexity

To set up House of Stake in a lean, cost-efficient manner, we will continue to leverage NEAR Foundation software and infrastructure where appropriate, avoiding duplication and unnecessary costs, while maintaining functional independence. (see section Team & Accountability, Implementation Notes)

End-to-end Value Hypothesis

Objective

• Start establishing independent infrastructure in a lean, cost efficient way
• Enable reliable execution
• Ensure compliance and security

Outcome

• Lean governance institution
• Spending discipline
• Executable decisions
• Functional Independence
• Transparent reporting

Dependencies on pending/upcoming proposals

• Any allocation of funds in the Co-Funding pool requires a separate tokenholder vote on the respective funding proposal (see section HoS Skin-in-the-Game (Co-Funding Pool))

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

KPIs:

- Execution Reliability: ≥95% of voting processes completed end-to-end on schedule; with financing and ops support in place.
- Transparency: 100% of required reports published in full and on time; 100% of delays communicated with clear updates within 48 hours.
- Compliance Readiness: 100% adherence to legal, regulatory, and reporting requirements (incl. Cayman Foundation obligations); zero compliance breaches at HoS Ops team.
- Security Robustness: 0 security breaches impacting treasury funds or governance/data infrastructure.
- Co-funded Projects Transparency: ≥90% of co-funded projects report against their stated milestones and meet them where House of Stake operations is responsible.
Note: House of Stake cannot guarantee outcomes beyond its scope of responsibility. Responsibilities are defined in each proposal’s RACI chart, and tokenholders approve proposals based on their trust in the capabilities of the stakeholders involved.

Reporting Cadence:

Quarterly: Comprehensive report covering KPIs, budget usage, buffer utilization, co-funding allocations, and functional independence.
Q3 2026: Mid-cycle review of budget allocation and outlook for Season #2 requirements.
Yearly: Full annual report, including audited financial report, on-chain records, evaluation of key mechanisms (buffer, co-funding pool), vendor selection report, and overall performance. Season #1 report due in February 2027.

Technical Specification, Budget & Ressources

Budget Breakdown

(all figures in USD $'000)

Applies to April–December 2026 (9 months). Core Ops Budget → ~$614.33k annualized.

Buffer & Risk Management

A $150k buffer is included to account for uncertainty and emerging risks.

Governance-Driven Execution Uncertainty

House of Stake executes tokenholder-approved proposals, making it impossible to fully predict:

• Volume and complexity of proposals
• Execution requirements
• Legal and technical overhead

The buffer ensures execution is never blocked by lack of resources.

Evolving Security Landscape (AI-Driven Threats)

AI-driven threats are rapidly increasing in sophistication. As House of Stake manages treasury flows, it becomes a high-value target.
The buffer enables:

• Additional audits
• Security upgrades
• Rapid response to threats

Any unused funds at the end of Season #1 will remain in House of Stake’s treasury.

Allocation Rules

Single allocation cap: $20k per use
The Head of Governance may approve allocations up to $20k at their discretion. All such uses must be disclosed in quarterly reporting.

Above $20k:
requires

• Screening Committee approval (Governance-driven execution uncertainty), or
• Security Council approval (Evolving Security Landscape)
• Disclosure required in quarterly reporting

Usage Scope
Use of these funds is strictly limited to the scope outlined above.

Prohibited uses:
• Recurring salaries
• Discretionary grants

HoS Skin-in-the-Game (Co-Funding Pool)

As NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, House of Stake is preparing to make decisions on allocating protocol revenues, generated by teams across the ecosystem (e.g., NEAR Intents and many others).

This is not “our” money. It represents ecosystem value created over months and years.

This responsibility requires more than coordination, it requires aligned incentives and accountability.

Mechanism

To ensure rigorous evaluation and meaningful “skin in the game,” House of Stake will introduce a Proposal Co-Funding Mechanism:

For any upcoming Season #1 funding proposal approved through House of Stake governance,

• House of Stake will co-fund 15% of the approved funding amount from its own treasury
• This contribution is capped at $500k for Season #1 (April–December 2026)

Rationale

This mechanism ensures that:

• House of Stake has direct economic exposure to the outcomes of its decisions
• Proposals are evaluated with increased discipline and long-term thinking
• Capital allocation remains aligned with the best interests of the NEAR ecosystem

By committing its own treasury alongside protocol-level funding, House of Stake strengthens accountability and signals confidence in the proposals it approves.

Example Scenarios

Scenario 1 — Cap not reached
Proposal asks for $800k total funding
→ $120k from HoS treasury (15%)
→ $680k from protocol revenues

Scenario 2 — Cap reached, prior co-funding: $400k
New proposal asks for $1.3M (15% = $195k)
Remaining HoS co-funding budget: $100k (cap constraint)
→ $100k from HoS treasury
→ $1.2M from protocol revenues

Scope & Review

• Applies to funding proposals approved during Season #1
• Requires a successful tokenholder vote on the respective proposal
• All upcoming proposals must specify the Skin-in-the-Game allocation in their details
• Total allocation in Season #1 is capped at $500k
• Quarterly allocation reports
• The mechanism will be reviewed and potentially updated after Season #1 through a new governance proposal

This is a first step toward building a governance system where decision-making and capital allocation are tightly aligned.

Backwards Compatibility

No protocol changes.

Security Considerations

Mitigations include:

• Audits
• Secure custody
• Legal oversight
• Transparent reporting

Stakeholders

• NEAR tokenholders
• House of Stake Head of Governance, team and Foundation directors
  proposal authors and stakeholders
• NEAR Foundation
• NEAR Ecosystem

Milestones & Implementation Plan

• April: Forum discussion
• April: Fully operational payment rails (crypto and fiat)
• May: Voting opens
• May: Budget approval and treasury activation
• May: Handover of contracts and licenses from NEAR Foundation to House of Stake
• Q2: Execution phase and quarterly reporting
• Q3: Continued execution and quarterly reporting
• Q4: Reporting, evaluation, and follow-up proposal. Any unused funds at the end of Season #1 will remain in House of Stake’s treasury.

Team & Accountability

RACI – Budget Responsibility & Decision Framework.

To ensure clarity, accountability, and efficiency in spending decisions, the following RACI (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) framework applies:

Implementation Notes

• Tokenholders remain the ultimate authority through governance
• Directors ensure legal and fiduciary accountability
• Head of Governance ensures alignment with mandate and priorities
• HoS IT and Ops Manager ensures execution and coordination
• HoS IT: Service providers with dedicated NEAR and security expertise, hiring in progress
• HoS Ops Manager: Hiring completed
• Additional Oversight Layers: Sensitive categories (treasury, legal, compliance) include additional oversight layers (Security Council, auditors, domain experts)
• Functional Independence:
  a) Backoffice: Where software and service agreements are already in place and have proven valuable, House of Stake will continue using existing licenses and contracts (e.g., Slack, Google Workspace, Notion).
  b) Execution Infrastructure: Core execution infrastructure (e.g., GitHub, Vercel, security and custody tools) must remain independent and under House of Stake control.
  c) Targeted Data Capability & Fiduciary Neutrality: House of Stake has a fiduciary duty to maintain independent visibility over all relevant data. This includes the capability to verify fund flows, revenues, and costs, and to conduct specialized economic analyses (e.g., unit economics, settlement trends), without relying on external parties or priorities.

For this proposal, the Head of Governance is authorized to select vendors based on best fit (quality, security, cost-efficiency). Vendor selections and key details will be disclosed in quarterly reports.

Governance of Continuation

Applies to Season #1 only, April 01 – December 31, 2026.

Conflicts of Interest

The author of this proposal serves as Head of Governance at House of Stake and is contracted by the NEAR Foundation, including for activities related to the implementation of this proposal.
The proposal is aligned with House of Stake’s mandate. To mitigate any potential conflict of interest, the Head of Governance will abstain from voting on this proposal. All relevant disclosures and potential benefits associated with this proposal are subject to House of Stake’s Conflict of Interest Policy and Code of Conduct.

Changelog

This proposal is an update to the budget proposal first published on April 16, 2026.
This revision includes

Frontmatter: Updated date

Abstract: Clarified separation of Ops Budget, Buffer, and Co-Funding Pool, added explicit authorization scope

Budget Structure: Clarified three components (Ops, Buffer, Co-Funding), adjusted category allocations toward leaner setup

Approach: Emphasized cost-efficiency and reuse of NF infrastructure, introduced concept of functional independence

Value Hypothesis: Expanded objectives and outcomes, added dependency on future co-funding votes

KPIs & Reporting: Structured KPI framework
added co-funding KPI, antroduced quarterly, mid-cycle, and annual reporting cadence

Technical Specification / Budget: Clarified scope as minimum viable operations, improved category descriptions and consistency, reduced funding ask for Operational Budget from $533.20k → $460.75 by leveraging efficiency gains (full independence → functional independence).

Buffer & Risk Management: Expanded with allocation rules and approval thresholds,
added governance structure and prohibited uses.

Co-Funding Pool (Skin-in-the-Game): Fully specified mechanism (15% rule, $500k cap),added scenarios and proposal-level requirements, clarified governance dependency on tokenholder votes

Milestones & Implementation: Refined timeline and sequencing

Team & Accountability: Expanded RACI (incl. buffer governance roles), added implementation notes (independence model, data responsibility), updated hiring status

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0 1.0.

This proposal raises serious concerns.

House of Stake is requesting $1.1832M for April through December 2026, yet the justification provided still feels too broad and too weak for a budget of this size. The language focuses heavily on “independence,” “execution capability,” “infrastructure,” and “compliance,” but the proposal does not clearly show why this spending level is necessary or how tokenholders will measure whether it delivered real value.

One of the first questions is structural. Why does House of Stake need a separate HoS Ops Manager if there is already a House of Stake manager, Angela (AK_HoG)? The proposal does not clearly explain what responsibilities this new role would own that are not already covered. Without that clarity, this looks less like operational efficiency and more like another layer of administration.

The second issue is the lack of concrete outcomes. Terms such as “execution reliability,” “transparent reporting,” and “security robustness” sound good, but they are still too generic on their own. These are management concepts, not measurable results. Tokenholders should be shown specific deliverables, timelines, accountability mechanisms, and success metrics. Otherwise, it is difficult to judge whether this budget creates meaningful value for the NEAR ecosystem.

The budget structure itself also deserves closer scrutiny:

• $533.2k for operations
• $150k buffer
• $500k described as “skin in the game”

The “skin in the game” component is particularly difficult to evaluate. If House of Stake is meant to oversee treasury governance, reserving up to $500k of its own treasury to co-fund proposals does not automatically create accountability. It may instead create a new discretionary capital pool with unclear standards, unclear oversight, and significant room for inconsistent decision-making.

The $150k buffer raises similar concerns. A reserve for uncertainty, AI-related threats, and legal contingencies may sound prudent in principle, but in practice it is still a large sum without sufficiently hard guardrails. Tokenholders are effectively being asked to approve a substantial flexible reserve before there is a clear framework for how, when, and under what limits it would be used.

The conflict of interest section does not fully resolve these concerns either. The author is Head of Governance, contracted by NEAR Foundation, and directly involved in implementation. Saying that he will abstain from voting addresses only a narrow part of the issue. It does not remove the broader concern that the same governance structure remains closely tied to the people designing and benefiting from it - Near Foundation (Illia is a security council at HoS and NF employees are part of Screening Comission).

At this stage, this does not read like lean governance. It reads like institutional expansion without enough precision, constraints, or proof of necessity.

If House of Stake wants broader trust, it should answer a few straightforward questions before asking tokenholders to approve this budget:

1. Why is a new Ops Manager needed if Angela already serves as HoS manager?
2. What concrete, measurable outcomes justify more than $1.1M in less than nine months?
3. Why should tokenholders approve such a large buffer without strict spending conditions?
4. What safeguards will prevent this from becoming another internal structure with weak accountability and high ongoing costs?

Governance decisions cannot be reliably executed

I’m fine with saving $1.5776M in funds here. If governance wasn’t competent (reliable execution) without these funds, it is undeserving of them. Nor should we expect that more money for bureaucrats will meaningfully benefit the community in anyway.

While contractors and other eaters may disagree, the community has yet to see any tangible benefits.

Thanks for bringing this proposed waste of funds to my attention!

The line items in this proposal is surprisingly high and unclear w.r.t scope and purpose

1. Legal and Compliance $134k

The proposal allocates $134k to legal and compliance without specifying:

1. What regulatory obligations apply
2. What specific legal risks require ongoing counsel

If House of Stake is simply (i) coordinating governance decisions, (ii) operating a multisig treasury, and (iii) executing tokenholder-approved proposals…then the compliance surface is limited.

Without clarity on legal exposures, and frequency and scope of legal work this line item is overstated.

2. Data and Insights (LLMs) $54k

The proposal includes $54k for “data analytics, monitoring tools, LLM licenses and agents” without defining:

• What is being measured: governance participation? voting participation?
• What scale of usage justifies this spend
• What measurable outcomes are expected

3. Compliance Tools $76.3k

I’d think for a small team <5? you do not need to pay for KYC tools just to onboard team members. It’s unclear why such tooling is necessary when many small teams handle compliance workflows manually or with minimal tooling

4. Software Subscriptions $27.9k

This is probably the one that first caught my eye.
SaaS tools: Google Workspace, Slack, Notion, GitHub… etc; are typically: ~$10–$30 per seat/month

How on earth are we spending $28,000 over 9 months?

5. Security Smart Contract Audits $90k

This one is probably the most concerning…not so much the cost, but the fact that the team is deploying smart contracts.
The proposal does not define:

• What custom smart contracts being developed and why

Allocating $90k implies undisclosed custom contract development which is worrying.

Conclusion

In its current form, this proposal has unclear uses of proceeds, has overbudgetd line items, and is therefore difficult to support.

Several major line items: legal/compliance, LLMs, compliance tools, software, and smart contract audits…are either not justified or don’t match the actual needs of a lean governance team.

Until the proposal clearly explains specific uses of funds, specific outcomes, why these costs are necessary, and aligns the budget with a realistic operating model, this proposal should not be approved.

Nice to see you take an interest in NEAR governance after a long hiatus.

I will not speak on behalf of the proposal author but a lot of the concerns you raise were candidly discussed in last week’s HoS GM (Governance Meeeting) call.

The HoS team is very different now to what it was a few weeks ago. From what I can observe; it’s a very lean team and the HoS Ops Manager will be the first hire under the HoSF. The roles and responsibilities of this person were covered in the job posting on the NEAR Careers page (can’t find it rn) as well as on a previous community call.

On point #2; you need to see HoS as a governance vehicle / infrastructure that enables NEAR tokenholders to take good and informed decisions for the ecosystem. Deliverables will mostly apply to proposals which involve tangible actions and changes. Curious how would you define success for HoS?

Agree, the $500K “skin in the game” might seem a bit vague, but isn’t the purpose of HoS to essentially use its treasury to fund proposals?

I don’t have an opinion on the buffer amount. Whilst there might be disagreements on its size; a buffer is necessary.

Saying that he will abstain

The HoG is a female

The $150k buffer raises similar concerns. A reserve for uncertainty

One of the lessons from Polkadot governance that pretty much everyone agreed on was to use of stables for these costs so to avoid any buffer altogether. Hopefully the House of Stake starts considering the inclusion of stablecoins into their operations and budgets that don’t require the use of the native token.

Hopefully a multi-asset treasury is considered in the future for HoA.

I need some more time to think and make a decision on that, but I already want to share my 2cents to set some baselines and common ground while I evaluate the proposal.

First,

I agree with setting up an operational budget for HoS and I believe going independent of the Foundation is a big win both for HoS and for the community/ecosystem. I also have no reason to doubt the team’s integrity and I believe these amounts have gone through careful diligence and have plausible justifications.

(Second,)

These justifications, however, are lacking in this proposal.

Other comments already did a good job pointing out specific points and concerns around each (or in general) and I believe all of them have some merit.

>$1.18M budget for 9 months ($131K/month) is a lot of money for a project in this stage that, afaik, won’t generate significant direct revenue back to the ecosystem. Putting it in contrast with the NEAR Intents MPC Network proposal by the SVRN team, which already raised some doubts and fair questions/concerns even while establishing solid basis for NEAR’s largest protocol revenue-wise so far.

If the expenses are justifiable (and I believe they might be), it’s simply not clear in this proposal’s current form. I agree we need much more details and clear justifications for a clean approval, which brings me to my third and last point.

Third,

I’ve noticed that recent high-budget approvals have been made in what looks like a rush.

This applies to the SVRN proposal and also to this one.

In what some discussions end up getting to: “But we need to approve this now, or…”

Putting community, delegates, and stakeholders against the wall for an “approve or die” situation.

For example:

• this proposal already addresses April expenses, while being proposed on April 16
• this proposal very likely is already being considered approved by the team and the new hirings (as @fiatisabubble mentioned in a comment here)
• together with infra, etc.

I don’t believe this is a governance good practice.

We shouldn’t be rushing to approve $1M budgets that have already being considered approved even before public deliberations.

What it does it creating incentives for YES votes even if the proposal is not in its ideal form yet (we saw that happening in the MPC Network program), with unclear promises of improving it on flight.

No. The proposals should be in their final form when approved.

What this suggests to me, and sorry for my honesty, is one of two things:

1. it was deliberate – the less likely scenario from what I can tell, as I truly believe in the team’s honesty and integrity

A sort of (dirty, imo) political strategy to have a better chance of having the proposal approved; which is manipulative and reduces the legitimacy of the approvals, imho.

1. It was unintentional

Which may suggest low efficiency in planning and execution.
Not a deal breaker, but not great either.

Even worse for such large amounts.

I understand the project is still maturing and many things need to get approved for HoS to finally take off, but there are better ways of doing it and it’s ok to aim for slow, organic, and gradual maturity and growth (which would probably mean a lower budget, overall).

All that said, I still not sure how I would vote on this one.

I’ll be following further comments here and I’ll try to join the calls (have not being able due to a change in my working schedule, with some meetings being placed right at the same time of the governance calls).

AK_HoG:

Governance decisions cannot be reliably executed

I’m fine with saving $1.5776M in funds here. If governance wasn’t competent (reliable execution) without these funds, it is undeserving of them. Nor should we expect that more money for bureaucrats will meaningfully benefit the community in anyway.

While contractors and other eaters may disagree, the community has yet to see any tangible benefits.

Thanks for bringing this proposed waste of funds to my attention!

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I believe the buffer is for unforeseen circumstances and not specifically for token price volatility but I think it’s a valid point to have a portion of the HoS treasury in stables.

The treasury which HoS inherits is almost entirely in NEAR so I wonder how they’ll go about it.

Thank you @Lacy @peitalin @fiatisabubble @Saxemberg @vinibarbosa for feedback and your questions, happy to provide answers!

I’ll first provide more context on where we are and how this proposal emerged, and then follow up separately with detailed responses on individual budget items.

Part 1: Context on the Proposal, Process, and Pace

1. Transition from NEAR Foundation Funding to Independence

Up until now, House of Stake has been fully funded by NEAR Foundation (NF).

• All 2025 costs, infrastructure, team, and service providers, etc. were covered by NF
• In January, following Lane’s departure, costs were reviewed and significantly reduced
• The team was restructured and relaunched (see March 19 blog post):
  https://houseofstake.org/blog/House-of-Stake-2.0

Today, House of Stake is operating on a bare-minimum setup required to function.

With the Citizens House vote passed in March, House of Stake has now its own treasury, and with that comes responsibility.

This proposal is not asking for “new” or “extra” funding.
It is transitioning existing, ongoing operational costs from NF to House of Stake, starting April 2026.

---

2. A Controlled and Gradual Transition

To avoid disruption, we aligned with NEAR Foundation on a phased approach:

• NF continues to cover personnel costs (e.g. Agora, core development work) during Season #1
• House of Stake takes over operational costs (infrastructure, legal, compliance, execution), as outlined in this proposal
• A co-funding (“skin in the game”) mechanism is introduced to align incentives
• A buffer is included to handle uncertainty during this transition

This is intentionally a measured and conservative step toward independence, not an expansion.

---

3. On “Gradual Growth” vs. Budget Size

It’s ok to aim for slow, organic, gradual growth (which would probably mean a lower budget)

This proposal is exactly that.

• We are not scaling headcount
• We are not expanding scope aggressively
• We are not introducing large new programs

We are simply:

Taking over the cost of running what already exists.
From NF’s perspective, they have already been patiently continuing to fund HoS month after month since early 2025.
This proposal ensures House of Stake can stand on its own feet.

---

4. On Timing and Perceived “Rush”

Recent high-budget approvals seem rushed

This proposal is not a sudden move, it’s the result of a multi-month transition.

Here is the timeline for context:

• Oct 2025: Launch of House of Stake (Oct 2025)
• March 09, 2026: Citizens House vote approving to Terminate the NEAR Community Purpose Trust by the transfer of all of its assets to the House of Stake Foundation
• March 19, 2026: Blog post outlining HoS 2.0 mandate and team structure
• April 05, 2026: Forum post introducing budget direction
• April 09, 2026: GM HoS Community Call to discuss the mandate and budgeting
• April 16, 2026: Forum post current budget proposal
• April 16, 2026: GM HoS Community Call to discuss the budget proposal in detail

This has been a progressive, public process, and we will take the necessary time to address open questions and incorporate any needed updates.

---

5. On Operational Urgency

One important clarification:

House of Stake is already expected to execute proposals that have passed.

To make this possible:

• We have hired an Ops Manager last week
• NEAR Foundation agreed to temporarily bridging these costs until a budget has been voted on to ensure continued operations

With its own active treasury as of March 2026, this bridging arrangement was agreed with the expectation that House of Stake transitions to funding its own operations starting in April 2026.

---

6. Summary

• This is not a growth budget, it is a transition to independence
• Costs already exist, we are simply taking ownership of them
• The process has been gradual and publicly communicated
• We need to respond to operational realities, without rushing decision-making

I’ll follow up with a second post addressing the detailed budget items and numbers.

Part 2: Clarification of Budget Structure

Let’s be precise:

• ~$533k → actual operational budget
  plus
• $150k → buffer (not pre-allocated spend)
• $500k → co-funding for future proposals (“Skin in the Game”)

So the majority of the $1.1M is not operational spend.

To reflect this more clearly, I’ll update the proposal title to:
“Establish House of Stake Operational & Proposal Co-Funding Budget for 2026.”

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2. Legal & Compliance — “Pure bureaucracy?”

This proposal is not introducing new bureaucracy, it is implementing what has already been ratified in the Constitutional Docs:

• House of Stake Foundation
• Proposal & Voting procedures
• Governance structure

Why legal compliance is necessary

The House of Stake Foundation exists to:

• Provide a compliant interface to the real world
• Protect tokenholders from liability

Without it, liability would be unclear (potentially falling on tokenholders).

However, this comes with real-world obligations:

• Cayman Islands regulatory compliance
• Directors, legal counsel, accounting
• KYC/KYB requirements

This is not optional, it’s the cost of operating a legitimate, accountable governance institution.

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4. KPIs & Measurable Outcomes

Operations are successful when they are invisible and reliable, but we still define clear, measurable KPIs:

• Execution Reliability: ≥95% of voting processes completed end-to-end on schedule
• Transparency: 100% of required reports published on time; any delays communicated within 48 hours
• Compliance Readiness: 100% adherence to legal and reporting requirements; zero compliance breaches
• Security Robustness: 0 security incidents affecting treasury or governance/data systems

Happy to refine these KPIs further, but they should remain meaningful indicators of performance, not vanity metrics.
Suggestions welcome.

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5. Proposal Co-Funding ($500k), “Skin in the Game”

Context

As NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, House of Stake will allocate protocol revenues, generated by teams across the ecosystem (e.g., NEAR Intents and many others).

This is not “our” money. It represents ecosystem value created over time.

Mechanism

To ensure accountability:

• House of Stake will co-fund 15% of every approved funding proposal from its own treasury, complementing funding from protocol revenues
• Each proposal must explicitly state the HoS contribution amount
• Total co-funding is capped at $500k for Season #1

Example Scenarios

Scenario 1 — Cap not reached

• Proposal asks for $800k total funding
• → $120k from HoS treasury (15%)
• → $680k from protocol revenues

Scenario 2 — Cap reached

• Prior co-funding: $400k
• New proposal asks for $1.3M (15% = $195k)
• Remaining HoS co-funding budget: $100k (cap constraint)
• → $100k from HoS treasury
• → $1.2M from protocol revenues

Why this matters

This mechanism ensures:

• Stronger evaluation discipline
• Direct economic exposure for House of Stake
• Full transparency for tokenholders

It is a key step toward building trust:

House of Stake is willing to commit its own capital alongside its decisions.

Scope & Next Steps

• Applies to Season #1 only
• House of Stake will report to evaluate:
  • Whether to continue or adjust the mechanism in Season #2
  • How House of Stake’s treasury should be funded long-term (e.g., sustainable revenue mechanisms, protocol revenue allocation, treasury mgmt.)

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6. Data & Insights ($54k)

What this covers

• Governance analytics (voting behavior, participation, power distribution)
• Program evaluation
• Dashboards and reporting

Why it matters

Tokenholders have the right to evaluate the outcomes of programs and the use of funds.

All proposals so far have included reporting and analytics. This budget ensures we can continue and improve this practice, generating insights on governance dynamics and optimizing proposal execution.

Examples of past work

• veNEAR program analysis
• Validator Support program evaluation
• Governance dashboards (e.g., voting power distribution)

Tokenholders expect data-driven decision-making and accountability.

Delivering this requires budget, for individual contributors, LLM tools, analytics software, APIs, and related infrastructure.

---

7. Compliance Tools ($76k)

Why this cost exists

House of Stake is becoming the financial interface of the NEAR ecosystem. This is not about KYCing a team of five.

• 112 entities rewarded in Jan 2025–April 2026 (4 months, HSP-002/-003/-007)
• Expected transactions in 2026: ~1000
• Both crypto and fiat flows

Each requires:

• KYC/KYB onboarding
• Ongoing monitoring

Costs:

• Simple KYC → cents
• Full KYB (business) → ~$50 per entity

We need tools + manual processes to handle this at scale and correctly.

---

8. Ops Manager Role ($63.5k)

Why this role exists

Operations are already scaling:

• 100+ recipients → growing fast
• Contracts, negotiations, onboarding
• Secure transaction execution (multi-sig)
• Address updates, verification processes
• Up to ~1000 transactions/year

Role split

• Head of Governance: strategy, system design, governance evolution
• Ops Manager: execution, coordination, day-to-day operations

In a nutshell:

• If HoS evolves → Head of Governance
• If HoS runs smoothly → Ops Manager

---

9. Buffer ($150k)

Why a buffer is necessary

Two realities:

a) Governance-driven uncertainty

HoS must execute unknown future proposals:

• Unknown complexity
• Unknown legal/technical requirements
• Potential urgent needs

b) Security risks (increasing rapidly, esp. with AI)

Treasury + payment flows = high-value target

Recent exploits show (over a dozen DeFi hacks in the past two weeks!)

Delayed response → lost funds

How buffer is controlled

Let’s add the following checkpoints:

• Screening Committee → approves proposal-related extra spend
• Security Council → approves emergency spend
• Full reporting applies, as outlined

Note that this buffer is not intended to offset NEAR price fluctuations. While handling price volatility is important, it should be addressed through a separate proposal.
As with all budget items, any unused buffer funds will remain in the House of Stake treasury.

---

10. Software Subscriptions ($27.9k)

Assumptions:

• ~$10–30 per user/month
• Multiple users per proposal (stakeholders involved in execution)
• Multiple tools required (PM, infra, LLMs, legal)
• Multiple proposals passed in Season #1

Example:

$20 per seat × 10 users × 3 tools × 9 months × 5 proposals ≈ $27.9k

This is a conservative estimate, not aggressive.

---

11. Smart Contract Audits ($90k)

The House of Stake smart contracts are available here:
https://github.com/houseofstake/house-of-stake-contracts

They include the veNEAR token mechanics, voting contracts, and non-upgradable lockup contracts, forming the initial foundation for governance incentives and voting.

This is a strong starting point, but it is not the end state.

Current contracts are limited:

• Basic voting (yes/no)
• Single voting power model

With HoS moving into economic governance, we’ll need:

• More advanced incentive design
• More advanced voting mechanisms beyond simple yes/no
• New governance patterns driven by 2026 proposals and ecosystem needs
• Stronger security guarantees

All of this demands careful implementation, robust security measures, and professional audits. At this stage, $90k is a reasonable and prudent allocation, not an excessive one.

---

12. What happens to unspent funds?

All unspent funds per budget item remain in the House of Stake treasury

Full transparency is ensured through:

• Quarterly reporting
• On-chain tracking of fund flows
• Oversight by the House of Stake Foundation

At House of Stake, no funds can be spent without:

• Director oversight
• Clear reporting obligations

---

13. Conflict of Interest

Please refer to the Conflict of Interest Policy.

Having an interest ≠ conflict.

This framework has been:

• Extensively discussed
• Ratified with 100% support

---

Closing

This budget proposal is about one thing:

Making House of Stake operationally independent, accountable, and capable of executing governance decisions at scale.

Happy to clarify further and iterate on the proposal.

Thank you so much, @AK_HoG, for this more comprehensive breakdown and the clarification of the budget structure. I personally view this transition to operational independence as a critical step in maturing the HoS, and I also believe that this budget is fairly conservative in terms of spend and reasoning.

I’d like to highlight a few points that I believe require further refinement to ensure this proposal meets the high standards that the HoS continues to build:

1. Treasury De-risking & Unit Economics: Following up on @fiatisabubble’s point; since our expenses (Legal, IT, Compliance) are USD-denominated but our treasury is NEAR heavy, we face significant currency mismatch risk - if the price of NEAR drops, it could have a negative effect on upcoming but allocated expenses. I would like to suggest a commitment to diversifying a specific percentage of this budget into stables upon approval to lock in the 9 month runway. This protects the HoS from being forced to sell NEAR during high volatility to cover fixed costs.

2. Enhancing KPIs for Utility over Hype: The current KPIs focus on execution reliability (i.e. the plumbing). I suggest adding a Value-Add KPI. For example: "Reduction in average proposal-to-execution lead time’" or "Percentage of co-funded projects meeting their own stated milestones.'" If HoS is putting 15% skin in the game, we should be tracking the ROI of that 15% specifically.

3. Addressing the Bureaucracy Concern: I’d like to see a commitment that by the end of Season #1, we evaluate service provider competition for the IT & Infrastructure and Data & Insights categories to ensure the HoS is getting the best market rates. It’s common in budget reviews to determine if the former budget spend is still required, and with changing markets, SP’s offerings could look very different, or our needs may change.

Overall, the ‘Skin in the Game’ mechanism is a really good addition to the budget, and a pioneering move for HoS accountability; I am also very supportive of this direction provided these volatility and oversight concerns that I mentioned are addressed. Having the ‘Skin in the Game’ mechnanism also allows for the HoS to demostrate that we are taking accountability and responsibility for the treasury, which is necessary for our long-term growth.

After 1.5 years and nearly a million dollars spent on creating the HoS, we are now told:

Governance decisions cannot be reliably executed

To resolve this, the HoS suggests that an additional $1.5M should be spent.

When asked directly what the tangible purpose of this exercise is, fiatisabubble flips the question back on the asker:

Curious how would you define success for HoS?

When someone asks for 1.5 million dollars, it should be incumbent upon them to outline the tangible benefits.

For me, this reads like circular reasoning. We are told that the results of the process will be further process. We are told the results of bureaucracy will be improved bureaucracy, with more seats. Credentials and hubris are waived around in lieu of any direct benefits for token holders or the larger ecosystem.

We need to be very clear on this point. Deliverables cannot be quantified as further process, for the process’s sake. There’s nothing personal in this. The individuals involved will respond to the incentives baked into the premises of HoS. Similar critiques were rightly leveled at the NDC and other structures. This is a consistent issue which has not been addressed.

This proposal is not introducing new bureaucracy…

This quote says it all. If you need to rationalize this spend on additional bureaucracy by claiming it isn’t new bureaucracy, you’re playing semantic games. Cite a document promulgated by your own bureaucratic process if you must. That’s fine. Reasonable people should be able to discern between that circular argument and the fact that HoS hasn’t delivered any tangible benefits.

0. Software Subscriptions ($27.9k)

Assumptions:

• ~$10–30 per user/month
• Multiple users per proposal (stakeholders involved in execution)
• Multiple tools required (PM, infra, LLMs, legal)
• Multiple proposals passed in Season #1

Example:

$20 per seat × 10 users × 3 tools × 9 months × 5 proposals ≈ $27.9k

Then there are basic mathematical inconsistencies. If we assume there is a monthly billing schedule, why has the price been multiplied by the number of proposals?

Which again, is just a side issue. However find it illustrative of the larger issue, which is that HoS has nothing to offer me as an ecosystem participant. Outside of the curated environment of forum discussions and whatever goes on in those “meetings”, the silent majority is highly skeptical of this process. When paid governance professionals conclude that they only need deliver “more process” rather than tangible results, they miss the point.

Hi all,

Looking forward to today’s GM HoS Community Call!
We’ll cover:

• Budget Proposal Q&A
• New Proposal Process Introduction

Come with your questions, let’s discuss.
Thursday, April 23 at 4 PM UTC!
https://meet.google.com/ynf-tfur-crx

To resolve this, the HoS suggests that an additional $1.5M should be spent.

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the silent majority is highly skeptical of this process

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I appreciate the detailed breakdown by AK, but I have a hard time reconciling the scale of this budget with the actual community engagement we see today. We are looking at a $1.1M proposal for an entity whose main announcement channel has only 75 followers.

If House of Stake is meant to be the ‘Treasury Governance Engine’ of NEAR, we have a massive mismatch between the overhead and the user base. A few specific concerns:

The ‘Skin in the Game’ ($500k): This feels like an accounting shell game. Moving $500k from the protocol treasury to the HoS treasury just to ‘co-fund’ back into the protocol isn’t creating new value; it’s just adding a layer of middle-man administration.

Administrative Bloat: We are spending $533k on operations—including a dedicated Ops Manager and $54k for ‘Insights’—to manage a governance process that currently lacks broad participation.

The KPI Gap: The proposed KPIs (95% reliability, 100% reporting) are for internal maintenance, not external growth. Where are the KPIs for increasing the number of veNEAR lockers or protocol revenue?

Right now, it feels like we are building a $1M Ferrari to drive 10 feet down the road. Shouldn’t we focus on a lean, ‘Season 1’ budget that prioritizes community growth before committing to $150k buffers and Cayman legal fees?

We have already seen the same pattern with projects like NEAR DevHub and Aurora Labs: large budgets, long timelines, constant “ecosystem development,” but no publicly visible revenue impact for $NEAR holders.

From what is being discussed, NEAR Foundation has already allocated around $2M to build HoS. And now the plans to spend another $1.5M per yearwrapped in “decentralization”

What kind of decentralization Angela is talking about if Screening committee , Security Council and HoS foundation (Bowen) are controlled by the Foundation?

Additionally, why are new roles and assistants being added while governance itself remains stuck? Expanding bureaucracy can make sense when a business is profitable and scaling revenue. But when there is no visible revenue, every new role should come with clear KPIs, public accountability, and measurable outcomes.

Otherwise, the pattern is obvious:

More spending.

More token sell pressure.

More internal bureaucracy.

More “ecosystem development.”

Still no revenue.

We are looking at a $1.1M proposal for an entity whose main announcement channel has only 75 followers.

Which exceeds the number of dapp launches on NEAR. At this point we have more bureaucrats and aspiring bureaucrats than builders or active projects.

If we assume there is a monthly billing schedule, why has the price been multiplied by the number of proposals?

Still looking for clarification on that software subscription math. I think the community is entitled to that much.

to spend another $1.5M per yearwrapped in “decentralization”

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Repeating false statements don’t make the argument any better.
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Thanks @DDeAlmeida for your comments:

Administrative Bloat: We are spending $533k on operations—including a dedicated Ops Manager and $54k for ‘Insights’—to manage a governance process that currently lacks broad participation.

We are looking at a $1.1M proposal for an entity whose main announcement channel has only 75 followers.

Right now, it feels like we are building a $1M Ferrari to drive 10 feet down the road. Shouldn’t we focus on a lean, ‘Season 1’ budget that prioritizes community growth before committing to $150k buffers and Cayman legal fees?

Let me clarify:
This budget proposal is not about growth or community participation.

It is about operations, to secure end-to-end proposal execution, in line with the House of Stake mandate. This mandate does not prioritize community growth.

Our mandate is to become NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine. This requires capabilities across the full proposal lifecycle, from early ideas to final execution and delivery.
That’s why the budget includes items like IT & Infrastructure, Security & Smart Contracts, and Legal & Compliance.

Many DAOs prioritized community growth for the sake of numbers, lost control over execution, and wasted significant funds.

The KPI Gap: The proposed KPIs (95% reliability, 100% reporting) are for internal maintenance, not external growth. Where are the KPIs for increasing the number of veNEAR lockers or protocol revenue?

The KPIs in this proposal are designed to measure HoS operational outcomes. The activities and infrastructure funded here will have only a limited impact on veNEAR locked or protocol revenues.
I do agree on adding a KPI for the co-funding aspect @coffee-crusher suggested though. It’s on my list for a proposal update, alongside other inputs from this discussion.

NEAR locked and protocol revenues are critical metrics for NEAR, but they should be addressed through dedicated proposals from ecosystem stakeholders, not within this proposal or by the Head of Governance.

On Software ($27.9k), Cost Reduction and Strategic Tradeoffs

Software ($27.9k)

There have been several questions around the SaaS budget, e.g.

why does a 2-person team need $27K for 9 months of subscriptions?
(@paulofonseca / Telegram)

Here’s more context:
At HoS, we’re currently using Google, Notion, GitHub, Vercel/Railway, NEAR AI, Claude Enterprise, and Slack. Nothing unusual.

We’re also not a 2-person team. We’re ~7 contributors today (including Agora and NEAR dev support for houseofstake.org), and we regularly collaborate with additional stakeholders per proposal (e.g. for execution, reporting, and KPI tracking).

That’s how the estimate was derived:

Blockquote
Assumptions

• ~$10–30 per user/month
• Multiple users per proposal (execution stakeholders)
• Multiple tools required (PM, infra, LLMs, legal)
• Multiple proposals in Season #1

Example
Per proposal:
$20 × 10 users × 3 tools × 9 months = $5,400
× 5 proposals ≈ $27.9K

Actuals may vary (fewer users or more proposals until end of Dec 2026), but ~$27.9K is a reasonable estimate for Season #1.

Cost Reduction Potential*

Over the past days, I’ve been verifying opportunities to reduce costs by leveraging existing infrastructure and licenses.

Potential adjustments:

• IT & Infrastructure: $68.25K → $58.5K
  Removing after-hours / 24/7 support and relying solely on the budget buffer (incl. triggering SC/SecC confirmation if needed, delaying response time)

• Data & Insights: $54K → $12K
  Using NF resources for most data/AI needs (keeping $12K for gaps)

• Compliance Tools: $76.2K → $51.3K
  Using NF licenses (Juro) instead of duplicating setup

• Software: $27.9K → $0
  Using NF licenses

→ Total reduction potential: $104.65K

This is not about removing budget items, because they are not required. It’s primarily a shift to shared NF infrastructure.

Strategic trade-off

This raises a broader question on direction:

a) Maximize for independence: build up our own, independent capabilities as soon as possible (in licenses, services, and bandwidth), and carry the associated costs
b) Maximize for cost efficiency: rely on NF infrastructure wherever possible, avoiding any duplication

I’ll confirm and finalize the reductions with NF early next week and will get back with an update. In the meantime, please share your perspective on this trade-off @everyone.

Actuals may vary (fewer users or more proposals until end of Dec 2026), but ~$27.9K is a reasonable estimate for Season #1.

For clarity, I’ll once again ask why a monthly billing schedule was multiplied by the number of proposals.

Thank you very much for you answers and addressing community concerns clearly!

I have a clearer picture of this proposal now, and leaning towards approving it.

I really appreciated it would be a good discussion for the sake of accountabilities.

@Mayor_of_Pumpopolis @Rosalia

For what I’m percieve, this is a way to ratified HoS Budget into the newly handed treasuries, which is previously funded from Near Foundations, which is will elevate the current standings for HoS as an Independent entity separate from the Foundations.

But I’ll really appreciated the discussion on how make the budgeting is more reasonable and cost effective, as @DDeAlmeida stated “Skin in Game” is just added Administration Layer, which I really think it’s not: based on my previous statement.

The Goal is to move HoS towards more independent entirely. Which I think would beneficial for the communities, to tapping any funding proposal that would benefit NEAR.

Sure, and perhaps the best way to move forward would be to start with a leaner approach. From that point we can gauge how effective this process is for the community. Starting with an expansion seems a bit preemptive.

The lack of clarity around basic arithmetic isn’t encouraging. Instead of explaining the SaaS billing figure, it was removed entirely? This doesn’t help us move forward with trust building.

There are other issues and questions I’d like answered. For now, I’m still waiting for clarification on why a monthly billing schedule was multiplied by the number of proposals.

Hi @Mayor_of_Pumpopolis happy to clarify:

Instead of explaining the SaaS billing figure, it was removed entirely?

clarification on why a monthly billing schedule was multiplied by the number of proposals

As mentioned, different proposals involve different stakeholders in execution. While we operate with a lean core team, each proposal requires coordination with multiple external parties, and these vary case by case.
To illustrate:

• HSP-002: Meta Pool (proposal lead), Gauntlet (data & analysis), small validators (reward recipients), NF Finance (funding), HoS directors & accounting (approvals)
• HSP-003: Meta Pool, Linear, Hot (staking integration), Gauntlet (data & analysis), Security Council (veNEAR allocations), NF Finance (funding), Agora (frontend staking and rewards claiming frontend), HoS directors & accounting (approvals)
• HSP-007: Sal (SVRN), Kendall (Proximity), Proximity Finance (payouts), NEAR One (performance reports, monthly), 8-21 node operators (monthly), NF Finance, Ops manager, HoS directors & accounting (approvals)

Across all of these, we coordinate via Slack, share documentation via Google Workspace, take notes (Gemini), and run analysis using LLMs (NEAR AI, OpenAI).
Since we’re dealing with private/sensitive data, we need proper access controls and user management. Many times we can grant guest access, but in some cases we need a paid enterprise license per contributor/API/project (estimate: up to 40 stakeholders in a single proposal, 10 paid licenses on average per proposal).
And because each proposal brings in a different set of people and access requirements, these tools don’t fully overlap. That’s why I’m modeling the licenses per proposal, not just per month.
More details in my previous post.
Hope this clarifies the rationale.

…SaaS billing figure, it was removed entirely?

As stated: Over the past days, I’ve been verifying opportunities to reduce costs by leveraging existing infrastructure and licenses.

→ Total reduction potential: $104.65K

This is not about removing budget items, because they are not required. It’s primarily a shift to shared NF infrastructure.
This raises a broader question on direction:

a) Maximize for independence: build up our own, independent capabilities as soon as possible (in licenses, services, and bandwidth), and carry the associated costs
b) Maximize for cost efficiency: rely on NF infrastructure wherever possible, avoiding any duplication

More details in my previous post.

Hey Angela! If you wanna earn the trust, I do believe you could show the transparency report on how House of Stake spend money at the moment for contractors like Agoda, Hack Humanity, etc. they all completely stopped sharing all reports ones you step on the role. I do believe there are a lot of unclear experiences. Some of them definitely can be reduced after building the core product and paperwork as well all social media and engagement are managing very poorly.

Aslo the first way to decentralization should be sorting out security and screening committee members rather one the huge budget.

Per Proposal Multiplier

I appreciate the detailed historical context, but the volume of text doesn’t clarify the specific logic of the per-proposal multiplier. The provided answer seems to be in response to an alternative question which was not asked: “Could you please provide an alternative method of estimation?”

these tools don’t fully overlap

Overlap is a concern when you multiply a monthly billing schedule by the number of proposals. To explicitly spell it out, it effectively pads the budget by overlapping static seats. Example: a single static seat for 9 months is now billed at the rate for 45 months, 1seat*9months*5proposals=45months of billing. This over bills the community for 36 months.

There are also temporal concerns for padding the budget. Example: A “collaborator” joins for a single proposal at month six. In real terms, if this user cannot be accommodated by a guest account, a single month of billing is due. Not 9 months or 45 months. Again, this is a troubling and misleading way to present your budget.

A higher standard of transparency is required when requesting funds. Even more so when the amounts exceed $1M for 9 months of meetings.

False dichotomy

a) Maximize for independence: build up our own, independent capabilities as soon as possible (in licenses, services, and bandwidth), and carry the associated costs
b) Maximize for cost efficiency: rely on NF infrastructure wherever possible, avoiding any duplication

This is a misleading framing. We are expected to believe that there are only two alternatives. Either we accept these astronomical sums, rationalized by questionable arithmetic, or we are to believe that the HoS will be dependent on the NF.

First of all, it remains to be demonstrated that the HoS would be meaningfully independent of the NF in either case.

The most damning indictment of this set of false alternatives, is that people all around the world seem to be able to collaborate, chat and share files (with per user permissions) without a heavy SaaS budget. Resourceful organizations operate effectively within their means by effectively budgeting themselves. These are the behaviors which inspire confidence, not scrutiny.

An “Option C” might look like:

Use alternative platforms. Share files with granular user based permissions for free on Google Drive. Create and manage private chats on any number of free services. Google Workspaces offers a free tier for nonprofits. If the nonprofit designation doesn’t apply, then that is another indictment of this process. We can reasonably expect that a resourceful organization would structure itself to take advantage of such offers.

I won’t attribute intent here. To many the outcome may appear as an attempt to pad the budget. Perhaps this is simply an oversight or a lack of command of basic arithmetic. Mistakes happen and we can all appreciate that. However in the context of a $1M+ budget for 9 months, the community is entitled to a higher standard.

Update - Transparency Report

Hi all! I promised a proposal update with cost reductions early this week. I’m on it… currently in the thrilling phase of “waiting for confirmations”.

In the meantime, a quick glimpse into my life as Head of Governance:

On one side: Anon builders, let’s call them Ken. Ken is a one-man DAO. Runs on open-source, vibes, and sheer willpower. No overhead, no process, just shipping. It’s worked for Ken forever, so if something doesn’t work that way elsewhere… clearly the system is broken (or everyone else is).
Ken posts about it. Often.

On the other side, we have service firms, let’s call them BigCorpish.inc. They operate in enterprise land, where the rule is: “you need this, or you can’t do international business.” Invoices and fee updates arrive… whenever they feel like it. Budgets going over by $10K? Barely worth a mention. Totally normal.
From their perspective, it’s hard to imagine a world where people don’t operate like this. They send terms accordingly.

And in the middle… there’s me. Translating between Ken and BigCorpish.inc, while trying to keep budgets, expectations, and sanity intact.

It’s less a role, more a survival skill.

Update: Adding a TL;DR

Perhaps this is simply an oversight or a lack of command of basic arithmetic.

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Thank you so much, @AK_HoG for continuing to work on this proposal to balance both the benefits and costs for the HoS; I look forward to reading the updated proposal.

Regarding your question to the community about the strategic trade-off between Option A (Full Independence) and Option B (Maximum Efficiency), I would like to suggest an Option C: Functional Independence. This approach balances fiscal responsibility with the sovereign requirements of a Treasury Governance Engine.

1. Utilize Shared Resources: I fully support leveraging shared licenses for general ‘back-office’ software (e.g., Slack, Google Workspace, Notion). There is minimal strategic risk in sharing these administrative tools during Season #1, and the cost savings are meaningful. This is a pragmatic way to meet the community’s request for increased efficiency.

2. Maintain Independent Execution Infrastructure: However, for HoS to deliver on Institutional-Grade Settlement, our core ‘Engine room’ (e.g., GitHub, Vercel, Security/Custody tools) should remain independent. Execution Sovereignty is essential; the code and the keys that drive our settlement engine cannot sit behind an external IT firewall. To ensure our Execution Reliability and Security Robustness targets are met, this infrastructure must be functionally autonomous and directly controlled by the HoS.

3. Targeted Data Capability & Fiduciary Neutrality: While existing resources are excellent for general analytics, I suggest we retain a baseline of independent Data & Insights bandwidth. This is about fiduciary neutrality and establishing proper checks and balances.

Now that the HoS has been entrusted with our own treasury, we also have the fiduciary duty to maintain its own set of eyes on the data. We must have the internal capability to independently verify protocol revenues and perform specialized economic evaluations, such as analyzing unit economics or settlement trends, without relying on external priorities. This ‘Trust but Verify’ model ensures our governance decisions are seen as objective, neutral, and fiduciarily sound.

By utilizing shared resources for general G&A while retaining independent technical and verification capabilities, we achieve significant cost reductions without creating dependencies in our core mandate. Thks!

First, thanks to AK and the HoS team for putting this together and for the willingness to keep pushing proposals forward. The work it takes to evolve House of Stake into NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, with operational independence, security infrastructure, and aligned incentives, is needed, and the urgency to ship it matters.

Sharing some thoughts ahead of the vote.

On framing

I’d like to see HoS continue to push as the main driving organization toward NEAR’s decentralization, rather than ceding that role back to centralized decision-making. The Skin-in-the-Game mechanism is a meaningful step in that direction, co-investment is one of the cleanest ways to make HoS behave as a principal rather than an agent allocating someone else’s capital. The underlying instinct here is right.

I’ve read the discussion so far and won’t relitigate the operational-budget questions others have raised on the per-proposal multiplier and SaaS line items. The recent “Functional Independence” framing, shared back-office tooling, independent execution infrastructure, and a “trust but verify” data capability, strikes me as a useful middle path between full independence and full reliance on NF, and I’ll wait for AK’s promised cost-reduction update before engaging further on those line items. My comments here are deliberately scoped to the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism, which I think deserves dedicated attention separate from the operational structure.

Three questions I’d want better answered before this becomes operational, and I think the broader community would benefit from the team’s explicit response:

1. What is HoS investing in? Is co-funding scoped to proposals that advance a user-owned future for NEAR: protocol decentralization, public goods, user-controlled infrastructure, developer ownership, or is it indiscriminate?

2. What’s the ROI? How does HoS define and measure return on its co-investment, and how do those returns flow back into future allocation decisions?

3. What is HoS actually doing with the capital? Where does it sit, who controls it, how is it disbursed, and how is it reported?

Reading the proposal against these questions

On #1 Scope. As drafted, the 15% co-fund “applies to all funding proposals approved during Season #1.” There are no thematic guardrails or eligibility criteria. A marketing spend, a vendor contract, and a user-owned-infrastructure grant would all receive the same treatment. If the rationale for co-funding is to ensure HoS has skin in decisions that shape NEAR’s decentralization arc, the scope should reflect that thesis. I’d suggest adding explicit focus areas, proposals advancing protocol decentralization, public goods, or user-owned infrastructure, with any exceptions justified in writing in the quarterly report.

On #2 ROI. The KPIs section lists Execution Reliability, Transparency, Compliance Readiness, and Security Robustness. All operational, all about how HoS runs, none about the outcomes of the proposals it co-funds. “Skin in the game” only changes behavior if there’s a feedback loop. I’d suggest adding at least one portfolio-level outcome metric, for example, “% of co-funded proposals that hit stated milestones by end of Season #1”, plus a published end-of-season portfolio review (not only allocation reporting). The “trust but verify” data capability raised earlier in the thread maps directly onto this: independent verification bandwidth is exactly what HoS would need to honestly grade its own co-funded portfolio. Without that outcome layer, the mechanism risks reading as a slogan rather than a discipline.

On #3 Capital handling. The general Treasury & Custody arrangement (Fireblocks, multisig, Foundation Directors accountable, Security Council consulted) is reasonable for operations. But the Skin-in-the-Game pool isn’t ring-fenced or separately custodied in the proposal, it sits inside the broader treasury structure. If the point is visible economic exposure, the pool should live at a published on-chain address anyone can monitor, with disbursement events reported transparently. The quarterly allocation report is a good start; the address would close the loop.

On the conflict-of-interest disclosure

The team handled this transparently, disclosing that the Head of Governance is contracted by NEAR Foundation and will abstain from voting is the right move, and I appreciate it being stated upfront. One structural observation in the same constructive spirit: the same role is also listed as the Responsible party for the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism in the RACI and is authorized to select vendors. Abstaining from the vote is appropriate, but the operating arrangement still concentrates responsibility narrowly across origination, execution, and vendor selection. As HoS matures, it would strengthen the institution to have additional operational checks, for example, Foundation Directors or the Security Council jointly accountable for Skin-in-the-Game disbursement decisions, not only consulted on treasury custody. This is less about any individual and more about the standing architecture HoS is establishing now and inheriting later.

Suggested amendments

To summarize, three asks I’d love to see addressed, either in this proposal or as a fast-follow:

1. Eligibility criteria / thematic priorities for the co-funding pool, anchored in NEAR’s decentralization thesis.

2. At least one outcome KPI and an end-of-season portfolio review for co-funded proposals.

3. A ring-fenced, publicly addressable on-chain location for the $500k Skin-in-the-Game pool, plus joint operational accountability beyond a single role.

Closing

The direction this proposal sets is the right one, and the bounded-by-Season-#1 review clause means we’re committing to an experiment, not a permanent structure. Alongside the cost-reduction update AK has signaled is coming, I’d ask the team to address the three Skin-in-the-Game points above. With those refinements, I’d be ready to support the proposal. Without them, I’d want a clearer sense of how the team plans to handle them before a yes.

Thanks again to AK and the team for the work and the openness to feedback.

Hi everyone,

This proposal has been updated to a new version incorporating community feedback. See changelog for details.

The minimum feedback period before Screening Committee approval and voting starts today and runs until May 11, 2026 according to HoS’s Proposal and Voting Procedures.

Hi @yadirab, thanks for the questions!

The updated proposal addresses many of them. I’ll follow up on the rest in a separate post shortly.

And in the middle… there’s me. Translating between Ken and BigCorpish.inc, while trying to keep budgets, expectations, and sanity intact.

It’s less a role, more a survival skill.

First of all, let me express my deepest sympathy for your struggles in fulfilling your duties in this paid role. I hope we can all stand in solidarity and support of your struggles.

There’s nothing personal in my critiques of mathematics, the budget or the overall results delivered. I expressed similar concerns over the NDC. We all know what a debacle that turned out to be.

Budgets going over by $10K? Barely worth a mention.

Big corporations can budget themselves differently than a small group.

This doesn’t excuse or explain the overages.

I like the precedent of including cute memes here. However, if the “Ken” characterization was targeted at myself, it is not only off-topic, but inaccurate. It isn’t hard to get it wrong here. In your own words, you described “Ken” as an anon builder. Presuming the background of an anonymous person tells us more about your imagination than the budget.

We still do not have a coherent explanation for:

1. The per-proposal multiplier
2. The misleading false dichotomy
3. Why on-chain governance meetings needed 24/7 IT support

Moving forward with a reduced budget is an improvement. I would recommend further cuts. The lack of accountability remains concerning.

Thank you so much for this thorough revision, @AK_HoG . I particularly appreciate the move to a ‘Functional Independence’ model.

By leveraging shared resources for administrative tools while maintaining sovereign control over our Execution Infrastructure, I believe we are striking the right balance between fiscal responsibility and institutional security. The explicit inclusion of Fiduciary Neutrality in our Data & Insights capability is a vital standard that is needed for the HoS, as it assumes oversight of protocol revenues.

Your revision successfully addresses my concerns regarding execution reliability and the ‘Trust but Verify’ mandate. I am ready to support this Season #1 budget for an on-chain vote. Tks!

Hi @yadirab thanks again for your questions on the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism, they are very relevant, happy to provide answers.

What is HoS investing in? Is co-funding scoped to proposals that advance a user-owned future for NEAR: protocol decentralization, public goods, user-controlled infrastructure, developer ownership, or is it indiscriminate?

HoS’s investment scope is defined by its mandate as NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine (see House of Stake 2.0).
The Constitutional Documents, which define the mandate-guided evolution of HoS, were ratified by tokenholders in February.

The mandate is intentionally narrow and focused on economics. Every proposal has to align with it, and the Screening Committee makes sure that bar is met.

According to this mandate, House of Stake will focus on proposals around Ecosystem Value Accrual & Economic Sustainability:

• Exploring approaches to ecosystem value accrual
• Exploring approaches to managing NEAR ecosystem assets in the long-term interest of the protocol. (such as top-level accounts)
• Evaluating approaches to long-term economic sustainability, including responsible governance of protocol economic parameters.

This blog post and this forum post provide more details.

Co-funding scope. The 15% co-fund applies only to funding proposals that are approved through HoS governance in Season #1. By definition, these proposals have already passed mandate alignment via the Screening Committee. So the co-fund isn’t indiscriminate, it follows the mandate filter.

What’s the ROI? How does HoS define and measure return on its co-investment, and how do those returns flow back into future allocation decisions?

The Skin-in-the-Game mechanism only provides co-funding to proposals that have passed. That means it’s ultimately up to tokenholders to evaluate whether a proposal meets their expectations in terms of ROI and overall value to the ecosystem—and to vote accordingly.

We intentionally don’t define a standard ROI/KPI. If you look at past proposals, they differ quite a bit:

• HSP-003 focused on increasing the amount of NEAR locked in the system, measuring success through things like total veNEAR supply and the percentage of staked NEAR migrated to House of Stake (see details here).
• HSP-007 focused on building out MPC node infrastructure, with success measured through metrics like monthly active MPC node count (see details here).

Even with just these two examples, the difference in goals and KPIs is clear. Because of that, it makes more sense for proposal authors to define their own KPIs, explain the expected ROI of HoS’s Skin-in-the-Game, and discuss it with tokenholders. Tokenholders can then make an informed decision when voting. Once a proposal passes, and only then, the mechanism is triggered and funds are disbursed from the Co-Funding Pool.

What is HoS actually doing with the capital? Where does it sit, who controls it, how is it disbursed, and how is it reported?

The latest proposal update adds more detail here:

• Quarterly reporting — A comprehensive report covering KPIs, budget usage, buffer utilization, co-funding allocations, and functional independence.

This will include HoS wallet addresses so fund flows can be tracked transparently. It also makes sense to hold the budget allocated for co-funding in a separate address for clarity.

As HoS matures, it would strengthen the institution to have additional operational checks, for example, Foundation Directors or the Security Council jointly accountable for Skin-in-the-Game disbursement decisions, not only consulted on treasury custody.

In fact, the process already includes these checks:

• Whether a proposal should pass, and receive HoS co-funding, is decided by tokenholders through the full, ratified governance process. That’s why tokenholders are listed as accountable, they have the final say.
• The Head of Governance executes the co-funding mechanism, but only after a positive tokenholder vote.
• HoS Directors and the Security Council, as well as the Screening Committee are also involved as part of the checks defined in the proposal process.

So decision-making, execution, and oversight are split across different actors within the governance framework so that no single entity can decide on any co-funding allocation.

Summary

This proposal is making a commitment that the House of Stake takes responsibility for making sound funding decisions, it does not, however, decide on specific allocations itself. The allocation is subject to the checks and balances defined in the House of Stake’s Proposal Process.

Overall, it’s great to see so many thoughtful questions around the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism. It clearly shows that when there’s real skin in the game, voters engage more deeply and evaluate proposals more thoroughly. That level of scrutiny is a key ingredient for making House of Stake successful.

Definitely the right direction, thank you for your questions @yadirab.

Hi all,

We’ve just published an updated version of the House of Stake Operations Budget Proposal for 2026/2027.

You can find it here:

Establish House of Stake Operational Budget for July 2026 – June 2027 Frontmatter hsp: TBD title: Establish House of Stake Operational Budget for July 2026 – June 2027 description: Defines the operational budget required for House of Stake to function as a Treasury Governance Engine, covering governance operations, legal compliance, treasury management, and execution capabilities. author: House of Stake Head of Governance (@AK_HoG) discussions-to: https://hos-fe-staging-4may-updates-staging.up.…

It’s about:

Lean Governance

Many DAOs talk about “lean governance” today.

Too often, that becomes a first step toward re-centralization, where key decisions and asset management gradually move back to a foundation, council, or small group of key leaders.

At House of Stake, we also need to go lean. But we mean something different.

House of Stake has a clear mandate: becoming NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, an independent body focused on economic policy. We have a Constitution and policy framework that were ratified by the community in February with 100% support, and we remain committed to that mandate.

When we talk about lean governance, we mean that governance operations should adapt to decision demand.

Our product is not software. Our product is legitimate, transparent, and well-informed decision-making in the best interest of NEAR. If demand for decisions is low, the operational apparatus supporting those decisions should be lean as well.

Why we’re reducing the budget

Since mid-April, when we published the first budget proposal, we have had six proposal authors preparing for a vote. We were running proposal clinics and workshops, while building the operational capacity needed to support several promising initiatives.

Since then, some proposals have been postponed, while others have not yet reached the proposal stage. As a result, governance activity has remained lower than expected.

We therefore propose a much leaner setup: We agreed with the NEAR Foundation that, until proposal flow increases sustainably, House of Stake will avoid building standalone operational infrastructure where suitable resources already exist. This way, we’ll preserve as much of House of Stake’s treasury as possible for future demand.

We will leverage NF capabilities wherever appropriate, particularly for:

• Software and operational licenses

• KYC/KYB infrastructure

• Payment rails

• Data and analytics

• Legal support

At the same time, House of Stake will maintain independence in areas that are core to its mission:

• Legal compliance and financial reporting for the House of Stake Foundation

• Treasury management and transaction security through NEAR’s Trezu infrastructure

• Dedicated governance, operations, and IT support where independent capacity is required, or where NF resources are limited.

Updated operating budget

The revised annual operations budget is:

$196,000 USD plus 60,000 NEAR

This represents approximately 23.16% of the original budget request in April.

Unlike previous budget proposals, this budget covers a full 12-month operating period rather than the remainder of 2026. We are nearly halfway through the year already, making the reduction even more significant. We remain committed to reduced costs if governance activity and proposal demand require it.

Removing Skin in the Game

We are also proposing to remove the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism.

This is not because the mechanism itself lacks merit. Rather, at this stage it remains unclear whether, when, and to what extent protocol revenues will be distributed through House of Stake in the foreseeable future.

Rather than implementing a mechanism without a clear use case, we believe it is better to revisit it when conditions justify it.

Removing the buffer

Finally, we have removed the operational buffer.

NF has confirmed it can support genuine emergency situations. Any additional costs arising from future proposals should be included and justified within those proposals directly.

Our principle: governance should breathe

These changes reflect a simple principle:

• We don’t build infrastructure that isn’t needed.

• We create systems that can grow and shrink with demand.

• We introduce mechanisms because they serve the ecosystem, not because governance frameworks are expected to have them.

• We keep costs low while remaining ready to scale when activity returns.

That said, thank you to all who made good thoughtful comments to the budget proposals so far. We hope it is clear that community feedback has directly shaped these changes, and we welcome further discussion!

Let’s prove that flexibility, speed, and collective decision-making can reinforce each other rather than compete with each other.
Onwards!